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INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT  
ANNUAL CASE LAW UPDATE AND COMMENTARY 
 
Kathryn E. Fort and Adrian T. Smith1 
 
I.   ABSTRACT 
 
There are, on average, 200 appellate cases dealing with the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) annually—including published 
and unpublished opinions.2 There are usually around thirty reported 
state appellate court cases involving ICWA issues every year. Before 
last year, no legal scholar had published a systematic overview of 
the cases on appeal that analyzed the parties involved, the issues on 
appeal, and the trends present in these cases.  For the second year 
in a row, this article seeks to fill that void. 
This article provides a comprehensive catalogue of 2018 
ICWA jurisprudence from across all fifty states. Designed as a quick 
reference for the ICWA practitioner, this article also summarizes 
key case decisions that have interpreted the law in meaningful, 
significant, or surprising ways and tracks current attempts by 
ICWA’s opponents to overturn the law piece-by-piece and in its 
entirety. By providing an overview of last year’s ICWA cases, this 
article is meant to keep practitioners up-to-date so that they can be 
effective in the juvenile courtroom without having to sort through 
and read dozens of cases published across all fifty jurisdictions. 
  
II.   INTRODUCTION  
 
In 1978, Congress recognized “that the States, exercising 
their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings 
through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the 
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and 
families,” and that this led to “an alarmingly high percentage of 
                                                
1 • Kathryn E. Fort is the Director of the Indian Law Clinic at Michigan State 
University College of Law and runs the ICWA Appellate Project. She graduated 
from MSU College of Law in 2005. Adrian (Addie) T. Smith graduated from 
Washington University in St. Louis Schools of Law and Social Work in 2012. 
She was previously the Government Affairs and Advocacy Staff Attorney at the 
Nation Indian Child Welfare Association.   
2 Data on file with the authors and journal. 
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Indian families [being] broken up by the removal, often 
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and 
private agencies.”3 To address this nation-wide issue, Congress 
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).4 ICWA creates 
“minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children 
from their families and the placement of such children in foster or 
adoptive homes” that state administrative and judicial bodies must 
follow.5  
Because of ICWA’s fundamental structure—being a federal 
law interpreted and litigated in state courts—tracking appellate 
litigation interpreting the Act is relatively easy. Indeed, state court 
decisions make up the body of ICWA case law and have influence 
beyond the state in which they are decided. That is because state 
courts often turn to “sister jurisdictions” when deciding matters 
related to ICWA precisely because it is a federal law applied across 
the states.6 For this reason, unlike other child dependency attorneys, 
an ICWA practitioner has to stay up to date on decisions from across 
the country in addition to decisions in their home state. This can be 
particularly difficult for those with an active caseload and limited 
access to legal databases, such as tribes’ in-house ICWA attorneys, 
parents’ attorneys, and child advocates (including guardians ad 
litem or children’s attorneys). It has become increasingly evident 
that practitioners are in need of an annual published account of the 
                                                
3 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)–(5) (2012). 
4 See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2012). For an overview of ICWA’s provisions, 
requirements, and an introduction to the law, see Native American Rights Fund, 
A Practical Guide to the Indian Child Welfare Act, available at 
https://www.narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/ [http://perma.cc/5WSH-6QUA]; B.J. 
Jones et al., The Indian Child Welfare Act Handbook (2008); National Council 
of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Indian Child Welfare Act Judicial 
Benchbook, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/ICWABenchbook 
[http://perma.cc/DGB3-2ZPV] 
5 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012).  
6 See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. J.G. (In re C.G.), 317 P.3d 936, 945 n.11 
(Or. Ct. App. 2014) (looking to decisions of sister states when interpreting 
ICWA); State ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. Marlene C. (In re 
Esther V.), 248 P.3d 863, 871 (N.M. 2011); In re Welfare of R.S., 805 N.W.2d 
44, 65 (2011); People ex rel. A.R., 310 P.3d 1007, 1014 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012); 
In re Welfare of S.R.K, 911 N.W.2d 821, 829 (Minn. 2018). See also In re N.B., 
199 P.3d 16, 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (collecting cases from the “several states” 
regarding ICWA’s application in step-parent adoptions), which was cited to in 
In re Adoption of T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492 (Wash. 2016) (applying the 
Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act to step-parent adoptions), which 
was further cited to and discussed in S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 574 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (applying ICWA to a private abandonment and step-parent 
adoption proceeding).  
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cases.7 Although much of family law is under the purview of the 
states,8 ICWA, which is grounded in the federal government’s trust 
responsibility to tribes and Indian people, holds a unique place in 
child welfare jurisprudence.9 It is a federal law that must be 
implemented in state courts—jurisdictions where there can be a 
great deal of legislative diversity.10  
ICWA’s provisions apply when there is an Indian child11 and 
a child custody proceeding.12 The law’s requirements include the 
following: States must inquire into the membership status of a tribal 
child,13 provide tribes and parents notice in child welfare 
                                                
7 Prof. Fort runs the ICWA Appellate Project at MSU College of Law. In 2017, 
her clinic handled inquiries in sixty-three different cases from more than thirty 
tribes handling cases in more than twenty states. In 2018, the clinic handled 
additional inquires in more than forty cases from more than thirty tribes. 
Additionally, for the past few years, Prof. Fort has collecting ICWA cases and 
discussing them online, but the need for a formal compendium has become 
increasingly obvious based on the inquiries from around the country both 
authors receive on a weekly basis. See Turtletalk ICWA Appellate Project, 
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/icwa/ [http://perma.cc/W4E5-8KMT].  
8 But see Jill Elaine Hasday, Family Law Reimagined (2014) (arguing family 
law has long been the purview of the federal government and the states, despite 
Supreme Court dicta stating otherwise). 
9 See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1)–(2) (2012). 
10 While the federal funding provisions under Title IV-E of the Social Security 
Act require states to pass certain standards for foster care placements and 
termination of parental rights, there are many areas of state law that vary by 
state. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670–679c (2012). See, e.g., Child Welfare Information 
Gateway, Wash., D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, Children’s 
Bureau, Consent to Adoption, (2017) available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/consent.pdf [http://perma.cc/VL7F-
22FH]; Child Welfare Information Gateway, Wash., D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs, Children’s Bureau, Representation of Children in Child 
Abuse and Neglect Proceedings (2014) 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/represent.pdf [http://perma.cc/4AUN-
8Z7S]; Child Welfare Information Gateway, Wash., D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs, Children’s Bureau, Rights of Unmarried Fathers (2014), 
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/putative.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3KUP-DU3G]; Child Welfare Information Gateway, Wash., 
D.C.: U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, Children’s Bureau, Definition of 
Child Abuse and Neglect (2016) 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf [http://perma.cc/BGJ3-
883Z]. Even in an area where state law is arguably quite similar—child abuse 
and neglect cases, for example—the vocabulary across the states varies 
tremendously. Indeed, the authors of this article debated whether to call them 
“child abuse and neglect cases” (Michigan) or “child dependency cases” 
(Oregon).  
11 25 U.S.C. 1903(4) (2012) (a child under the age of eighteen who either is a 
tribal member or is both eligible for tribal citizenship and the biological child of 
a tribal member). 
12 Id. at (1). 
13 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012).  
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proceedings,14 and ensure that tribes are given the opportunity to 
intervene in the proceedings15 or transfer jurisdiction to the tribal 
court.16 The party removing a child or terminating parental rights 
must provide active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian 
family17 and present testimony of a qualified expert witness 
supporting such a decision18 before placing an Indian child in foster 
care or terminating the parental rights over an Indian child. 
Additionally, proceedings under ICWA involve increased burdens 
of proof,19 among other things.  
ICWA has been interpreted to apply in conjunction with, and 
in some instances on top of, state child welfare laws.20 When an 
Indian child, as defined in the law, is subject to a child custody 
proceeding, also defined in the law, ICWA’s protections and 
standards must be implemented by state courts.21 Though ICWA is 
not a unique federal intrusion into state family dependence 
proceedings, it is one of the few laws of this kind that are not 
required to be incorporated into state law in order for a state to 
receive federal funding. Many states have incorporated parts of the 
law, while a few have passed comprehensive Indian child welfare 
acts.22 
   To best serve the active practitioner, this article first 
provides an overview of related case data, including information on 
where there were reported (and unreported) decisions interpreting 
                                                
14 Id. 
15 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (2012). 
16 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2012). 
17 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012) 
18 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)–(f) (2012).  
19 Id.  
20  See In re K.S.D., 904 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 2017); Valerie M. v. Ariz. 
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 198 P.3d 1203, 1207 (Ariz. 2009) (collecting cases). 
21 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2012). See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42 (1989) (applying ICWA in ‘child custody 
proceedings’ involving an ‘Indian child’ as defined by the Act). 
22 See, e.g., Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 
712B.1–41 (2012) (comprehensive state ICWA); Minnesota Indian Family 
Preservation Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 260.751–835 (1999) (comprehensive state 
ICWA); Washington Indian Child Welfare Act, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.38.010–
190 (2011) (comprehensive state ICWA); Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1501–1516 (2015) (comprehensive state ICWA); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-453 (2017) (merely requiring compliance with ICWA); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-126 (2002) (requiring compliance with ICWA and 
specifically-inquiry, notification, determination, transfer to tribal court); Or. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 419A.116, 419B.090, 118, 150, 171, 185, 192, 340, 365, 366, 452, 
476, 498, 500, 875, 878, 923 (2001) (Imbedding ICWA standards in relevant 
areas across Oregon’s dependency code). 
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ICWA, what provisions courts most commonly interpreted, and 
what themes arose in 2018. The article then provides a descriptive 
commentary on a handful of 2018 state and federal cases that best 
illuminate the described themes. It closes with a full compendium 
of 2018 ICWA cases, which is topically organized for those 
practitioners who may not have access to this information.   
 
III.   SUMMARY OF THE DATA AND NATIONAL TRENDS 
 
 Every year, there are usually around thirty reported state 
appellate court cases involving ICWA issues. However, until 
recently, there has never been a systematic look at the cases on 
appeal that includes an analysis of who is appealing and what the 
primary issues are on appeal. Legal databases make both published 
and unpublished cases more readily available to the practitioner and 
scholar, but the sheer volume of cases can be overwhelming. The 
authors of this article read every case as they were released through 
daily alerts from Westlaw, LexisNexis, and the Alaska court system. 
Each case was coded by the primary ICWA topic on appeal.23 The 
cases were also coded with the date, the court, the child’s named 
tribe,24 the parties involved, and the court’s decision.25 These 
numbers do not include federal challenges to the law, which are 
discussed separately below under Cases of Note.  
Because of time limits and capacity, the ICWA topics on 
appeal have been coded by only one of this article’s authors. This 
means there are some cases that cross topics and might be coded 
differently by a different reader. Therefore, the count of topics is not 
meant to be statistically sound, but rather provide general guidance 
concerning the trends on appeal. The general elements of each topic 
are listed below: 
 
Inquiry26 considers whether the case primarily discusses social 
services or the court’s failure to ask questions about a parent’s 
                                                
23 Active efforts, burden of proof, qualified expert witness, inquiry, notice, 
transfer to tribal court, foster care proceeding, termination of parental rights, 
guardianship, Indian custodian, intervention, appealability, appointment of 
counsel. 
24 In notice cases, often there are a number of tribes identified as potential tribes 
for the child. We collect up to three named tribes and put them in the order they 
appear in the case. We publish the first named tribe here, unless the court 
determines the Indian child’s tribe later in the opinion. 
25 Affirm, remand, reverse, dismissed 
26 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 (2017). 
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indication that they may be American Indian. This may include 
cases where notice was sent without enough information, but the 
included cases are limited to those in which the issue is a lack of 
inquiry rather than incorrect notice. 
 
Notice27 is at issue any time there is discussion of the adequacy of 
notice to tribes. This includes notice that goes to the wrong tribe, the 
wrong address, not enough tribes, or was not updated with new 
information.  
 
The nature of foster care proceedings28are analyzed to determine 
what proceedings are implicated under ICWA. 
 
Removal29: opinions involving the standards, including evidentiary, 
of the removal of a child from the home. These may include both 
emergency and non-emergency proceedings. 
 
Termination of Parental Rights30: When a parent or tribe challenges 
more than one element of an ICWA termination of parental rights, 
including active efforts, qualified expert witness, or the burden of 
proof. 
 
Active Efforts31: When a parent challenges the active efforts finding 
in either a foster care or termination proceeding. 
 
Qualified Expert Witness (QEW)32: When a parent challenges the 
qualified expert witness testimony in either a foster care or 
termination proceeding. 
 
Indian Child33: When a tribe has been identified, and the court is 
trying to determine whether the child is an Indian child under 
ICWA’s definition. This will include reason to know the child is an 
Indian child cases, which are separate from faulty notice cases. 
 
Placement Preferences34: the party appealing is contesting the 
placement order of one or more children. 
 
                                                
27 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §. 23.111 (2018).  
28 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2018). 
29 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.113–
114 (2018). 
30 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.120–123 (2018). 
31 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)–(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.2, 23.120 (2018). 
32 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (e)–(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.122 (2018). 
33 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.108–109 (2018). 
34 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.129–132 (2018). 
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Jurisdiction35: When the state court is determining whether it has 
jurisdiction to hear the case. 
 
Transfer to Tribal Court36: when a party appeals an order either 
denying or granting a transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court. 
 
Guardianship37: When the court determines whether ICWA applies 
to a guardianship. 
 
Consent to Termination38: When a parent appeals an order 
terminating parental rights that involved the parent’s consent to the 
termination. 
 
Appointment of Counsel39: When the case primarily addresses the 
right to appointment of counsel under ICWA. 
 
Burden of Proof40: when a party challenges either the clear and 
convincing evidence standard or the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of ICWA. 
 
Appealability41: when a court determines whether an order in an 
ICWA case is appealable.  
 
Tribal Customary Adoption42: Cases interpreting California’s Tribal 
Customary Adoption statute. 
 
As the numbers show, ICWA is litigated more often than 
non-practitioners might imagine. State courts of appeal interpret the 
law across the country at a rate of once every other day. There are, 
on average, 200 appellate cases annually—including published and 
unpublished opinions.43 In 2017, there were 214 appealed ICWA 
                                                
35 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.110 (2018). 
36 25 U.S.C. § 1911(2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.115–119 (2018). 
37 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.103 (2018). 
38 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 1913 (2012); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.124–
128j (2018); 25 C.F.R. §§ 23.136–137 (2018). 
39 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2012). 
40 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)–(f) (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 23.121 (2018). 
41 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2012). 
42 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 366.24 (West 2013). 
43 Data on file with the authors and journal. 
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cases. 44 Thirty-four were published.45  In 2018, there were 206 
appealed ICWA cases, but only forty-nine were published.46 As we 
noted last year, the small number of reported ICWA cases 
understates the amount of appeals, and the lack of reporting leaves 
important analysis and guidance as non-binding.47  
Supreme Courts in seven different states issued reported 
ICWA-related opinions this year, including Alaska (three cases), 
Montana (seven cases), South Dakota (two cases), Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, and North Dakota.48 Meanwhile, Alaska had 
another eight unreported decisions, Montana another three, and 
Nevada issued one. The remaining opinions, published and 
unpublished, were authored by states’ intermediate Courts of 
Appeal. The number of ICWA appellate cases varied significantly 
by jurisdiction, as did the number of cases which the courts chose to 
report.49 
While unpublished opinions cannot be used for precedent, 
the authors include those cases in the numbers here to reflect the 
actual litigation practitioners encounter. As always, the authors have 
                                                
44 Cases are collected from both Westlaw and Lexis over the course of the year 
via case alerts that collect cases from all fifty states and using the search terms 
“Indian Tribe”, “American Indian”, “Native American”. The cases are sorted by 
case name, the date, the court, the state, whether the case is reported or not, the 
top two issues, up to three named tribes, the outcome of the case, and who 
appealed the case. 
45 Data on file with the authors and journal.  
46 2018 Data on file with authors and journal. 
47 See Kathryn E. Fort, Indian Child Welfare Act Annual Case Law Update and 
Commentary, 6 AM. INDIAN L.J. 32,  36 (2018); Matter of Dependency of K.S., 
199 Wash. App. 1034, 2017 WL 2634788 (Div. I June 19, 2017); New Jersey 
Div. of Child Protection and Permanency v. E.W., 2018 WL 3384284 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 12, 2018) (discussing equal protection challenges to 
ICWA). 
48 It is important to note that Alaska, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota, 
do not have or use their court of appeals for child welfare cases; appeals are 
taken directly to the state supreme court. See Section III for a summary of these 
cases. That said, last year Montana only had two reported cases. 
49 Yet again, California leads the states with 125 cases, but only nine were 
reported. California has both the most number of cases, and one of the lowest 
percentages of unreported cases at about seven percent. Alaska is second with 
eleven opinions, three reported; followed by Montana with ten opinions, and 
seven reported. Michigan had eight opinions but reported only two, while 
Colorado issued 8 opinions and published all eight. Ohio, Arizona, and Texas 
each issued four opinions, and reported two, one, and two, respectively. Illinois 
issued three unreported opinions. Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, and Washington 
each issued two unreported opinions. Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota each 
issued two reported decisions. Finally, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, and Nevada 
issued one unpublished opinion each, and Minnesota, Nebraska, and North 
Dakota each published their one decision. 
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only summarized reported cases, but practitioners may want to keep 
in mind that unreported ones may still have significant legal research 
and reasoning useful to their cases. Last year, we speculated on the 
reasons why there may be so many unpublished decisions but did 
not land on an answer. However, most of these unreported cases 
address the issue of inquiry and notice—an area so common and 
well-established that there may no longer be a need to report these 
opinions.  
Similar to what we saw last year, the vast majority of this 
year’s active efforts cases—eleven out of thirteen—were 
unreported.50 This may reflect how fact specific most active efforts 
cases are. There is, however, a drawback to this lack of reporting 
because the determinations of what active efforts consists of remain 
inconsistent. In thirteen cases in eight different states, only one was 
remanded for the trial court to make specific active efforts 
findings.51   
In addition, a little more than half of the termination of 
parental rights cases were reported.52 These cases concern multiple 
aspects of the findings that are required for termination, including 
active efforts, the burden of proof, and qualified expert witnesses. 
In every single case, the termination was affirmed. Finally, there 
were more placement preference cases than last year, and although 
only two of these cases were published, nine were decided.  
  The most litigated issues were notice and inquiry,53 
followed by active efforts, termination of parental rights (which 
includes burden of proof issues), placement preferences, foster care 
proceeding, tribal customary adoption, and determination of Indian 
                                                
50 In re B.Y., 432 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2018); In re Adoption of Micah H., 918 
N.W.2d 834 (Neb. 2018), Terry S. v. Superior Court, No. A148984, 2018 WL 
300078 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2018); In re K.R., No. A153781, 2018 WL 
6428088 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2018); In re D.R. Wolf, No. 343001, 2018 WL 
6070462 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2018); In re S.D.M., No. 78142-1-I, 2018 
WL 5984147 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2018); Jude M. v. State, 394 P.3d 543, 
547 (Alaska 2017); Vanessa W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 17-0461, 
2018 WL 2147213 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 10, 2018); Ronald H. v. State, No. S-
16725, 2018 WL 1611648 (Alaska Mar. 28, 2018); In re A.F., No. 17-0487, 
2018 WL 1282575 (Mar. 13, 2018); In re C.P., No. F075660, 2018 WL 1045063 
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2018); Janice H. v Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 
17-0343, 2018 WL 893981 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2018); Charles V. v. State, 
No. S-16575, 2018 WL 913105 (Alaska Feb. 14, 2018). 
51 In re B.Y., 393 Mont. 530, 432 P.3d 129 (2018);   
52 Ten out of eighteen cases were reported. 
53 Notice was the subject of litigation in eighty-six cases, and Inquiry was the 
subject of litigation in forty-three cases. 
	  	   30 
child.54 Of all the cases, seventy-nine or around forty percent were 
reversed or remanded.55 This year exactly half of the notice cases 
were remanded for proper notice (forty-two), and two were 
reversed. Slightly more than half of the inquiry cases were remanded 
as well (twenty). Fifty-seven different tribes were named as possible 
tribes of the children in these cases. In twenty-six cases, the tribe 
was unknown (the parent did not know name of his or her tribe). In 
seventeen, the tribe was unnamed (the court did not record name of 
tribe in the opinion).  
There are a few trends worth noting this year. While the total 
number of cases is down, the number of reported cases has increased 
considerably given the small sample size. This indicates one reason 
to distinguish published cases from unpublished cases; this way, the 
count does not seem artificially inflated by the number of reported 
cases. The types of cases remained generally the same as last year. 
This year, not a single tribe appealed an ICWA case 
reviewed by the author. While there are no clear statistical reasons 
for this, the authors can provide some anecdotal ones based on their 
experience. Many tribes simply do not have the capacity to take a 
case up on appeal; either these tribes lack counsel or their counsel 
does not have the capacity to take such a case up. In some cases, the 
tribe or its outside counsel may either disagree with the appeal or 
have interests adverse to the parent’s position. Tribal attorneys are 
also often concerned about the duration of the appeals process and 
the effect it may have on a child. In many cases, tribes are simply 
never notified of an appeal by a parent. Even if a tribe does receive 
notice of a case going up on appeal and wants to participate, finding 
a local attorney for pro hac vice is incredibly difficult in some states. 
The court or agency may also be unwilling to share even basic 
information with the tribe if it considers that information to be 
confidential. If a tribal attorney can get past all of that, many state 
appellate court rules simply do not contemplate intervenor party 
briefs at the appellate level, so tribes are forced to choose between 
filing an amicus brief or attempting motion practice on appeal to 
                                                
54 The numbers of cases for each category of litigation are as follows: Placement 
Preferences (nine), Active Efforts (thirteen), Termination of Parental Rights 
(eighteen), Indian Child (twelve), Tribal Customary Adoption (four), Transfer to 
Tribal Court (one), and QEW (one). 
55 Of the 206 total cases, seventy-four were remanded and five were reversed. Of 
the forty-nine reported cases, twenty-five were affirmed; twenty-two were 
remanded or reversed; one was dismissed; and one was affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.  
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ensure their status as a party. Unfortunately, without any tribal brief 
on appeal, appellate courts often have no guidance concerning a 
tribe’s position. The lack of a brief or participation is sometimes 
misinterpreted as a lack of concern for the child or family or the 
alignment of tribal and parental interests. In some decisions, the 
court’s confusion is apparent and its ignorance of the tribe’s position 
comes through in the opinion.  
An additional trend this year is the increased number of cases 
interpreting state laws that implement ICWA. California and 
Michigan in particular had cases that rest heavily on interpretations 
of state law.56 California’s tribal customary adoption law, a unique 
state law that allows a state court to apply tribal law in the context 
of an adoption, was interpreted four times by California state 
courts.57 In addition, Michigan had a procedurally difficult and 
complex case involving a father consenting to termination in the 
face of a state termination hearing.58 The outcome of that case was 
based exclusively on the Michigan Supreme Court’s reading of the 
Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act rather than a reading of 
ICWA. The cases summarized in Section III are only those in which 
courts interpreted ICWA, but practitioners must be increasingly 
aware of state-specific law holdings insofar as they apply to Indian 
children.  
Two states in particular had an uptick in the number of 
opinions they issued—Montana and Colorado. In particular, 
Colorado’s Court of Appeals issued a number of considered 
opinions regarding inquiry and notice for which it provided specific 
and detailed remand instructions.59 Remand instructions in child 
welfare cases are particularly important and should be an area of 
focus for ICWA appellate practitioners. The most obvious example 
of a problematic reversal or remand on appeal was in Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl,60 after which no state court held a placement 
hearing regarding the child’s best interest. Because a remand or 
                                                
56 See In re J.Y., 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re A.S., 239 
Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re Williams, 915 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. 
2018). 
57 In re J.Y., 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re A.S., 239 
Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); In re L.S. 2018 WL 3371960 (Cal. Ct. 
App. July 11, 2018); In re A.S., 2018 WL 3196529 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 
2018). 
58 Williams, 915 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. 2018)  
59 In re J.L., 428 P.3d 612, 616–617 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018). 
60 570 U.S. 637, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013) 
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reversal can end up changing the placement of a child immediately, 
appellate attorneys should consider providing specific instructions 
in the conclusion portions of their briefs.61  
Montana’s reported cases ran the gamut of ICWA issues, 
including active efforts, the determination of who may be 
considered an Indian child under the law, notice, and the termination 
of parental rights. While the Montana court continued to apply 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl62 to its paternity cases, to the 
detriment of Native fathers, it also applied the ICWA Regulations in 
a fairly strict manner.63 Montana is also the location of a new ICWA 
court in Yellowstone County.64 The court represents an attempt to 
bring more collaboration between the state and local tribes to the 
child welfare process when it involves Indian children. The court is 
an attempt to treat all parties—parents, tribes, and children—with 
the respect and consideration they deserve.  
And finally, as had been the case since 2015, the federal 
challenges to ICWA continue apace. Though standard ICWA 
practice continues in state courts around the country, much of the 
media coverage and national legal work has focused extensively on 
cases out of Texas and Arizona. In particular, the facial challenge to 
the law by the states of Texas, Indiana, and Louisiana is the greatest 
threat to ICWA since its passage, though none of the arguments 
made in that case are new or were unconsidered by Congress and 
courts at the time of ICWA’s passage.  
 
IV.   CASES OF NOTE 
 
The authors have chosen to highlight and summarize the 
cases below because they present relevant issues, reflect trends in 
litigation from across the country, and/or sit in a unique procedural 
posture that reflects the current challenges to and interpretations of 
                                                
61 Compare In re J.J.W., 902 N.W.2d 901, 919 (Mich. Ct. App.) (vacating an 
order denying an adoption petition, vacating the order removing children from 
petitioners with no instructions as to where the children should go), with In re 
Williams 915 N.W.2d 328, 337(Mich. 2018) (describing where the children 
should stay during the remand).  
62 Matter of P.T.D., 424 P.3d 619 (Mont. 2018). 
63 Matter of B.Y., 432 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2018). 
64 Phoebe Tollefson, 1 year into Native foster care court, most kids taken from 
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ICWA that are described above. They address issues of jurisdiction, 
Indian child, qualified expert witnesses, and active efforts. A full 
listing of the forty-nine published cases are in Section IV. 
 
A. Federal Cases 
 
Because ICWA is implemented in state court, federal cases 
involving the law are usually rare. However, due to a series of 
affirmative attacks on the law in federal court which started in 2015, 
there have been a number of published federal opinions (from 
district courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court) over the 
past four years. This article includes published decisions from 2018 
and notes concerning cases that are currently under appeal.65  
 
Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F.Supp.3d 514 (N.D. Texas, 2018) (on 
appeal to the Fifth Circuit as Brackeen v. Bernhardt, No.18-11479 
(5th Cir. 2019)).  
 
In this federal case, three state plaintiffs, Texas, Louisiana, 
and Indiana, and a number of individual plaintiffs, including the 
Brackeens, a couple from Texas looking to adopt a Navajo and 
Cherokee child whose mother’s rights had been previously 
terminated by the state; the Librettis, a couple from Nevada looking 
to adopt a child from Ysleta del sur Pueblo and the child’s biological 
mother; Ms. Hernandez, who would like to place her child with the 
Librettis; and the Cliffords, a foster couple from Minnesota looking 
to adopt a child who is a member of the White Earth Band of Ojibwe 
Tribe sued the United States, seeking to have ICWA declared 
unconstitutional. The named defendants are the United States 
Department of the Interior and its Secretary Ryan Zinke; the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA) and its Director Bryan Rice; BIA Principal 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, John Tahsuda III; the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services; and Secretary 
Alex M. Azar II (each of the individual defendants are named in 
their official capacities). Not long after the case was filed, four tribal 
nations, Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, Quinault Indian Nation, 
                                                
65 The Ninth Circuit dismissed, in an unpublished memorandum decision, Carter 
v. Tahsuda, No. 17-15839, 743 Fed.Appx. 823 (Aug. 6, 2018), cert petition 
filed, Carter v. Sweeney, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 18-923 (Jan. 16, 
2019).  
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and Morongo Band of Mission Indians, moved to intervene as party 
defendants. 
 The plaintiffs filed two amended complaints, and the federal 
government and tribal intervenors both filed motions to dismiss. In 
their opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs filed a motion 
for summary judgment. The court allowed briefing to move ahead 
on the summary judgment. In addition to the parties stated above, 
six states (California, Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon and 
Washington) filed an amicus brief in support of the federal 
government, as did 123 tribes and fourteen tribal organizations. The 
State of Ohio and the Goldwater Institute filed amicus briefs on 
behalf of the plaintiffs. 
 On October 4th, the court issued an opinion finding much of 
ICWA unconstitutional and the ICWA regulations violative of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Most disturbingly, the court 
held that ICWA violates the equal protection requirements of the 
Fifth Amendment.  The court found that “by deferring to tribal 
membership eligibility standards based on ancestry, rather than 
actual tribal affiliation, the ICWA’s jurisdictional definition of 
‘Indian children’ uses ancestry as a proxy for race and therefore 
‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’”66 The 
court then found that the statute failed the test under strict scrutiny 
because it was overbroad; the court also held that the Act 
“establishes standards that are unrelated to specific tribal interests 
and applies those standards to potential Indian children” and is 
therefore unconstitutional.67  
 Second, the court held that section 1915(a) of ICWA violates 
the Non-Delegation Clause in Article I.68 Section 1915(a) allows for 
tribes to set preferences concerning the placement of Indian children 
that states must follow.  The court held that, because tribes are not 
federal actors and “[t]he power to change specifically enacted 
Congressional priorities and impose them on third parties can only 
be described as legislative”69 as opposed to regulatory, 1915(a) 
impermissibly delegates legislative authority to tribes. 
                                                
66 Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F.Supp.3d 514, 533–34 (N.D. Texas, 2018). 
67 Id. at 535. 
68 Id. at 536. The non-delegation clause generally stands for the proposition that 
Congress cannot delegate its legislative authority to another branch of 
government, such as the executive branch. As Indians and Indian tribes are only 
mentioned in two clauses of the Constitution, the non-delegation clause 
obviously does not address delegation to Indian tribes.  
69 Id. at 537. 
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 Third, the court held that 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–23 and 1951–
52 violate the Tenth Amendment. The court found that, because 
those provisions “require the States to apply federal standards to 
state created claims,”70 they are impermissibly commandeering state 
courts and agencies to administer federal law. The court added, 
“While Supremacy Clause preemption may apply to a conflict 
between state and ‘federal law that regulates the conduct of private 
actors,’ it cannot rescue a law that directly regulates states.”71 
 Finally, the Court held that the BIA lacked the authority to 
promulgate the 2016 ICWA Regulations and that doing so violated 
the APA.72 The court noted that in 1979, the BIA found that it lacks 
authority to promulgate regulations. The court then noted that the 
BIA did not adequately address its authority to promulgate 
regulations in 2016 despite extensive regulatory discussion on this 
issue that preceded the issuance of the regulations. The court then 
stated, “Because the BIA does not explain its change in position over 
its authority to ‘carry out the provisions’ and apply the ICWA—and 
therefore its authority to issue binding regulations—the Court finds 
those regulations remain not necessary to carry out the ICWA.”73  
For those reasons, the court held that the BIA “exceeded the 
statutory authority Congress granted to it to enforce the ICWA”74 
when it promulgated binding regulations (as opposed to advisory 
guidelines) and, therefore, violated the APA in doing so.  
 The court also found that ICWA does not violate a 
foster parent’s substantive due process rights.75 The court 
reasoned that foster parents do not have a constitutionally 
protected right to an intimate relationship with their foster 
child. No party has appealed this issue. 
 The intervenor tribes moved to stay the opinion of the district 
court pending appeal to the Fifth Circuit. The tribes pointed out the 
decision is contrary to precedent on all grounds, including basic 
precepts of standing and mootness, federal Indian law, 
administrative law, and constitutional law. The tribes also noted the 
decision is specifically contrary to Congressional intent and that the 
application of the decision would cause considerable confusion 
                                                
70 Id. at 539. 
71 Id. at 541. 
72 Id. at 542. 
73 Id. at 543. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 546. 
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nationwide.76 The district court denied the stay77 and the tribes both 
filed for a stay and appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit.78 They 
were later joined in the appeal by the federal government.79 The 
Fifth Circuit granted the stay.80 At the time of this writing, the Fifth 
Circuit case has been briefed and oral arguments are scheduled for 
March 13, 2019.81 In addition, the Navajo Nation filed to intervene 
in the Fifth Circuit, and was granted intervenor status as well.  
While the State of Texas attempted to hold its attorneys and 
courts to the district court’s decision,82 no state court has agreed with 
the reasoning or agreed to apply the holding to other cases. As a state 
court in Texas noted,  
 
The Department contends the . . . [district court’s] 
order render’s J.R.M’s complaints moot, but the 
order does not indicate that the plaintiffs challenged 
the specific ICWA provisions at issue in this case. 
Further, the Brackeen case may be appealed and 
ICWA has previously been upheld by the United 
States Supreme Court. . . . Therefore, we will 
address the merits of the issues raised on appeal.83 
 
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2018). In 
this long-running federal court case challenging both ICWA and 
due process violations in child welfare cases in Pennington 
                                                
76 Opposed Mot. for Expedited Consideration and Mot. to Stay Pending Appeal 
of Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, Quinault Indian Nation, and Morongo Band 
of Mission Indians, Brackeen v. Zinke No. 17-cv-858 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2018). 
77 Order, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 17-cv-858 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2018).  
78 Mot. to Stay Pending Appeal, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 18-11479 (5th Cir. Nov. 
19, 2018).  
79 Notice of Appeal, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 18-11479 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2018). 
80 Per Curiam Order, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 18-11479 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018). 
81 All of the briefing is available at https://turtletalk.blog/icwa/texas-v-zinke-
documents-and-additional-materials/texas-v-zinke-fifth-circuit-document/ 
[http://perma.cc/2Y9F-HN2U] 
82 Inapplicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act to Texas Child Custody 
Proceedings Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. 51 (2018), 
http://texaschildrenscommission.gov/media/83949/oag-icwa-ruling-letter-to-
dfps_10252018.pdf. [http://perma.cc/E4YE-7JVD] cf. Resource Letter: For 




83 In re A.M., 2018 WL 6583392, 2 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018). See also In 
re M.D., 920 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 2018). 
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County, South Dakota, the Eighth Circuit held that the Younger 
abstention doctrine applied and vacated and remanded with 
instructions to dismiss.  
 This case was a class action lawsuit brought by the Oglala 
Sioux and Rosebud Sioux Tribe, as well as Madonna Pappan and 
Lisa Young, mothers who had their children removed by the State 
and eventually returned to them. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
initial 48-hour hearing held after the State removed a child from the 
home violated both ICWA and fundamental due process rights, 
including a lack of notice and the right to cross examine witnesses. 
The district court agreed and granted declaratory and injunctive 
relief. The Eighth Circuit found that under Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 
415 (1979), the State’s emergency hearings were of the type that is 
due Younger abstention. While the plaintiffs argued that the relief 
sought was prospective and that there was no opportunity to address 
the federal claims in those hearings, the Court noted that there were 
on-going emergency hearings during the pendency of the federal 
proceeding and that “[t]he relief requested would interfere with the 
state judicial proceedings by requiring the defendants to comply 
with numerous procedural requirements at future 48-hour 
hearings.”84 
  
B. State Cases 
 
In re L.D., 391 Mont. 33 (2018).  
 
In this Montana case, the initial petition stated that “to the best of 
the petitioners belief” the child “is an Indian child for the purposes 
of [ICWA].”85  At the initial show-cause hearing, the parents both 
stated that they did not believe the child to be eligible for tribal 
enrollment, and the child’s mother (who was herself enrolled) stated 
that she had unsuccessfully attempted to enroll the child.86  The 
agency remained uncertain, stating that it would further investigate, 
and asked that the court proceed under ICWA.87 The tribe was 
                                                
84 Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2018), appeal 
docketed, No. 18-1245 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2019) 
85 In re L.D., 391 Mont. 33, 34, 414 P.3d 768 (2018). 
86 Id. at 35. 
87 Id. 
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notified regarding the case and advised the agency that it would not 
intervene or assume jurisdiction.88   
 Nearly a year after the show-cause hearing, the agency filed 
a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights, stating that the 
department “believed” that the child was “subject to [ICWA],” and 
served the tribe.89  The tribe did not appear at the termination 
proceeding, but an expert witness testified and the court’s findings 
were made pursuant to termination standards in section 1912 of 
ICWA.90  Four months later, the agency filed a termination petition 
against the mother.91  At the termination proceeding, the State 
asserted—for the first time—that the child was not an “Indian 
child.”  When the mother did not object, the court determined that 
the standards of ICWA did not apply to the termination 
proceeding.92 For this reason, the agency did not present an expert 
witness and the findings made by the judge that supported the 
termination of the mother’s parental rights did not comply with 
section 1912’s requirements.93  The mother appealed.  
 The appellate court found that when there is reason to 
believe that a child is an Indian child, as there was here, the agency 
has a “threshold duty to obtain a conclusive determination from an 
Indian tribe of tribal eligibility” prior to proceeding with a 
termination.94 It further noted that a parent cannot waive the 
application of ICWA—for only a tribe can determine its 
membership and thus, the application of the law.95  The appellate 
                                                
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 35-36.  
90 Id. at 36.  
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 37.  
94 Id. at 40.  
95 Id. at 41.  
The Supreme Court of Montana added the following:  
While we appreciate the difficult position in which the District 
Court found itself as a result of the parties’ imprudent 
agreement or acquiescence that ICWA did not apply, it was 
ultimately the Court’s responsibility to demand and ensure 
strict compliance with ICWA and due process of law 
regardless of the parties’ invitation and escort down the 
proverbial garden path.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
we hold that the District Court erred and abused its discretion 
by proceeding to terminate Mother’s rights * * * without a 
conclusive tribal determination of [the child’s] membership 
status and eligibility.  
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court then reversed the decision and remanded it for the appropriate 
determination regarding ICWA’s applicability.96  
 
J.W.E. v. State, 419 P.3d 374 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018)(In re 
J.W.E.).  
 
In this Oklahoma termination of parental rights case, the agency 
caseworker testified that at the time of the trial, January 23, 2017, 
they had received letters from the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes and 
the Choctaw Nation stating that the children were not eligible for 
enrollment.97  The mother also explained that, while she was a 
member of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, her children were not 
eligible for membership in that tribe.98  She also stated that until she 
became an established member of the Choctaw tribe,99 her children 
would also be ineligible for membership in that tribe. 100  At the time 
of the termination trial, the mother had testified that she was enrolled 
as a member of the Choctaw Nation and had filed Choctaw 
enrollment paperwork for her children.101  In fact, the mother 
described in great detail the numerous conversations she had had 
with the Choctaw child welfare and enrollment departments; the 
efforts she had made to obtain the necessary information, including 
birth certificates and death certificates, to apply for tribal enrollment 
for her children and herself; the fact that enrollment applications had 
been submitted; and that it typically takes the Choctaw Nation about 
three months to make a decision.102   
 On January 31, 2017, the trial court (pursuant to a jury 
decision) terminated the mother’s parental rights.103 The order 
terminating her rights stated that the court had previously found that 
the children were not Indian children for the purposes of ICWA.104 
 Shortly after the announcement of the jury verdict, the 
mother received notice that the children had been enrolled in the 
                                                
96 Id. at 41.  
97 J.W.E. v. State, 419 P.3d 374, 376 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018)(In re J.W.E.).   
98 Id. at 375. 
99 Based on the explanation in the record, this meant that although she was a 
member of the Choctaw Tribe, her enrollment in Cheyanne Arapaho precluded 
her from receiving benefits from Choctaw Nation. Id. at 375. 
100 Id. at 376. 
101 Id. at 375.   
102 Id. at 375–76. 
103 Id. at 376.  
104 Id.  
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Choctaw Nation and that their membership had been certified by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs on January 10, 2017, and by Choctaw 
Nation on January 20, 2017.105  The mother promptly filed a motion 
for a new trial asserting that “because the children were enrolled 
members prior to and at the time of trial, all proceedings, including 
the trial, were subject to [ICWA] and [the] Oklahoma Indian Child 
Welfare Act” and that none of the requirements of those statutes had 
been followed.106  The trial court denied the mother’s motion and 
she appealed.107 
 The appellate court began its opinion by reciting the 
language from section 1912(a) of ICWA which requires notice when 
there is “reason to know” that a child is an Indian child and citing to 
George v. Traylor, 68 Va. App. 343, 808 S.E.2d 541 (2017), which 
states that the quoted language “is a clear indication that Congress 
intended the notice provisions to be effective in situations where 
there was still question as to whether the child is an Indian child.”108   
 Then, after extensively reviewing the relevant 2016 
Guidelines and the Federal Regulations, the court concluded that, in 
spite of the Choctaw Nation’s earlier letters, the mother’s detailed 
testimony at the termination trial was sufficient to put the court on 
notice that there was reason to know that these children were Indian 
children and that ICWA applied.109  Further, the appellate court 
found support from an Oklahoma case, In re M.H.C., 381 P.3d 710 
(Okla. 2016)—a case in which the court held that “ICWA applies 
prospectively to a proceeding when the record establishes [that] the 
child meets ICWA’s definition of Indian child”—for its holding that 
that the date an individual gains membership is the date ICWA 
becomes applicable.110  Here, the court noted the relevant date, 
January 20, 2017, was before the commencement of the termination 
trial, January 23, 2017.111 For those reasons, the appellate court 
reversed the decision to deny the mother a new trial. 
 
 
                                                
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 378. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 380.  
111 Id. at 381.  The court also clarified that ICWA became applicable on the date 
of enrollment and therefore it did not apply retrospectively even though the case 
began years earlier in 2011. Id.  
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In re A.P., 818 S.E.2d 396 (2018).  
 
At the abuse and neglect adjudication for this North Carolina 
case, the court admitted into evidence a form indicating that the 
mother and child have “American Indian Heritage” within the 
“Cherokee” and “Bear Foot” tribes.112 The mother’s counsel 
brought this form to the court’s attention and argued that the hearing 
should be continued because the tribe had not received notice 
pursuant to ICWA.113  The trial court proceeded with the hearing, 
indicating that it had already made a finding that ICWA was not 
applicable in its non-secure/temporary custody order.114 
 The court of appeals found that the record was sufficient to 
“put the trial court on notice and provided ‘reason to know that an 
‘Indian child’ [was] involved.’” 115 The trial court was therefore 
required to direct the agency to send a notification letter to the tribe 
before proceeding.116 The appellate court reversed the decision and 
remanded to ensure that “ICWA’s notice and other mandatory 
requirements are met.”117 
 
In re Beers, Nos. 341100–1, 2018 WL 4339705 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Sept. 11, 2018). 
 
In this Michigan termination of parental rights case, the court 
terminated the father’s parental rights under state law and the 
mother’s parental rights under the requirements of ICWA and the 
Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), reasoning that 
ICWA only applied to the mother who had Indian heritage.118  The 
mother119 and father appealed.  
                                                
112 In re A.P., 818 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2018).   
113 Id. at 398–400. 
114 Id. at 400.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. Interestingly, the court noted that because of ICWA’s application, notice 
and the tribe’s response was of particular importance because it could deprive 
the court of subject matter jurisdiction—not just because it could require a 
variety of different protections in state court. Id. 
117 Id. at 400-01. 
118 In Re Beers, Nos. 341100–1, 2018 WL 4339705 *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 
2018). 
119 On appeal, the mother made fact-based arguments that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that the agency had provided reasonable efforts and that 
continued custody of her child would likely result in serious emotional or 
physical harm.  Id. at *11.  These arguments were unremarkable—and therefore 
not summarized here.  Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the termination 
of her rights under ICWA and MIFPA.  Id. at *11-12.  
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The appellate court found that there was no doubt that the 
child was an “Indian child” as defined by the Act.120 It also noted 
that the father who had acknowledged that he was the child’s 
biological father by signing an affidavit of parentage, was a “parent” 
as defined by ICWA and MIFPA.121  The State conceded that ICWA 
and MIFPA should have applied to the father’s proceeding and the 
case was remanded to allow the trial court to apply the relevant 
provisions of ICWA and MIFPA.122  
 The appellate court, however, raised the issue of whether 
ICWA section 1912(f) and MIFPA MCL 712B.15(4), which state 
that “no termination of parental rights may be ordered in the absence 
of a determination…[and] that continued custody of the child by the 
parent…is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage 
to the child,” applied to this case because, as is required under 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013), 
the father never had legal custody of the child.123 The Michigan 
appellate court noted that although the majority opinion required a 
parent to have physical or legal custody for section 1912(f) to apply, 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence concluded that the decision was fact-
specific and that the father in that case not only lacked custody of 
his child but also never lived with or cared for her.124 For those 
reason, Breyer stated that different facts—e.g. regular visitation or 
satisfactory payment of child support by a non-custodial parent— 
could lead to a different conclusion.125  The Michigan court also 
noted that it was unclear whether the Supreme Court intended the 
requirement of physical custody to necessarily entail legal custody 
or if that requirement could be met when “a custodial-like 
                                                
120 Id.  
121 ICWA defines parent as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child 
or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including 
adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where 
paternity has not been acknowledged or established.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) 
(1978); see also MIFPA MCL 712B. 1-41 (stating the same).  
122  Beers, No. 341100-1, 2018 WL 4339705 at *5, 10.  The State also argued 
that under plain error review the trial court’s decision should be affirmed and 
that in any rate the decision can be upheld, even under the ICWA and MIFPA 
standards. Id. at *9.  The court found that there was no preservation issue 
requiring plain error review and that to otherwise affirm would require 
impermissible fact-finding by the appellate court that the court refused to do.  Id.   
123 Id. at *5-6 
124 Id. at *8. 
125 Id.  
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environment existed on a practical level absent any technical 
custodial rights.”126 
 The Michigan court then determined that the facts in this 
case were dissimilar from those discussed in Baby Girl because here 
the father had acknowledged his paternity and lived with and cared 
for the child for a period of time.  This meant that the State’s 
intervention had “discontinued the custodial arrangement that had 
existed with respect to [the child], if not in law, in practice,” 
rendering ICWA section 1912(f) and MIFPA MCL 712B.15(4) 
applicable to the termination proceeding.127   
Finally, the court noted that although the active efforts 
provisions of ICWA section 1912(d) and MIFPA MCL 712B.14(3) 
only apply to the “breakup” of an Indian family, here the family was 
previously intact and for similar reasons those sections apply in spite 
of the decision in Baby Girl, which stated that custody was a 
necessary prerequisite for the application of those provisions.128 
 
In re E.R., No. 17CA0460, 2018 WL 1959477 (Colo. App. Apr. 
19 2018).129   
 
In this Colorado case the child was born six weeks 
premature130 and the agency sought and received emergency 
custody after the hospital reported that it could not locate the parents 
to take him home. 131  The agency then filed a dependency and 
                                                
126 Id. at 8 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at *10.  The court also distinguished this case from a Michigan case that 
found Baby Girl applicable, In re S.D., 236 Mich. App. 240, 599 N.W. 2d 772 
(1999).  In that case, there was no agency intervention and the family had been 
living apart for quite some time before the termination proceeding—so the 
appellate court found that the family had “already broken up by the time the 
termination proceedings were initiated.”  Id. at *9.  Here, the court reasoned 
reunification services were necessary because the State had intervened but the 
family had otherwise been and would be intact. Id.  
129 People In Interest of E.R., also discusses a state law question regarding the 
admissibility of results of a umbilical cord drug test at the adjudicator hearing, 
finding that those test results are admissible under Colorado’s medical treatment 
hearsay exception. No. 17CA0460, 2018 WL 1959477, at *2-4 (Colo. App. Apr. 
19, 2018).  
130 Each state (and sometimes each county within a state) has a different name 
for the agency that performs child protective work and oversees the out-of-home 
placement of children whose parents are unfit or alleged to be unfit, for ease and 
clarity that entity will be referred to as “the agency” throughout this article 
regardless of the state or county in question.   
131 E.R. at *5. Supra note 128 at *5. 
	  	   44 
neglect petition. Later at a shelter hearing, the court granted the 
agency’s request to return the child to his parents with agency 
supervision.132  At that hearing, the court did not ask whether the 
child was an Indian child and instead checked the box stating that 
“[t]he Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 is not applicable because 
the child is not placed out of the home.”133 The case then proceeded 
to adjudication and disposition and the mother appealed from the 
court’s dispositional order134 because it did not apply ICWA’s 
standards.135   
 Citing to both the 2016 Guidelines and the new regulations, 
the appellate court found that the shelter hearing was subject to 
ICWA because “ICWA applies to any action that may result in a 
foster care placement.” The court then stated that “[f]or the purposes 
of ICWA, it is immaterial that the child is not presently placed out 
of the home.”136  The opinion explains that in this case, the trial court 
might have decided to continue the removal and that because the 
court decided to leave the dependency action open, it continued to 
have authority to remove the child at any time thereafter.137   
 Having decided that ICWA applied, the appellate court, 
again citing to the 2016 Guidelines and the new regulations, held 
that the court erred when it failed to ask whether the child was an 
Indian child.138  The applicable federal mandates, the appellate court 
reminded, required “the trial court to ask at the commencement of 
each child custody proceeding whether any participant knows or has 
reason to know that the child is an Indian child” as defined in ICWA. 
139  The court then remanded the case with instructions to determine 
whether the child was an Indian child and, if the child was identified 
                                                
132 Id. at *1. 
133 Id.  
134 ICWA section 1912’s provisions apply to a “foster care placement” as 
defined by the act.  25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1).  Whether the adjudication or 
disposition is the “foster care placement” proceeding is a question courts across 
the country disagree on.  See, e.g., In re Esther V., 149 N.M. 315, 248 P.3d 863 
(2011) (finding the adjudication to be the foster care proceeding.   
135 E.R., at *1 
136 Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).  
137 Id. (emphasis in original; citing to 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 and 2016 Guidelines at 
13). 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at *5 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) and 2016 Guidelines at 11). 
Interestingly, the court also noted that Colorado’s ICWA-Implementing 
legislation, §19-1-126(1)–(2), C.R.S. 2017, requires trial courts and child 
welfare agencies to inquire into the children’s tribal connections “at the earliest 
opportunity.” Id.   
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as such, to comply with section 1912(a) of ICWA—the section that 
regulates notice to tribes in a foster care proceeding.140 
 
Matter of Welfare of S.R.K., 911 N.W. 821 (2018).   
 
In this Minnesota termination of parental rights case, the 
parents’ rights were terminated after a QEW signed a notarized 
affidavit before trial stating that “[c]ontinued custody of the children 
by the parent(s) is likely to result in serious physical and/or 
emotional damage to the child,” but testified at trial that she had no 
opinion about whether children could be returned to the parents, that 
her affidavit remained true, and that she had not honestly considered 
the child’s father when preparing the affidavit.141 Both parents 
appealed.  
The appellate court began by noting that section 1912(f) of 
ICWA and the Minnesota Indian Family Protection Act (MIFPA) 
counterpart provision, Minn. Stat. § 260.771, subd. 6(a), are 
substantively identical.142  Then, the appellate court went on to 
interpret those provisions using Minnesota rules of statutory 
interpretation,143 finding that the statute was unambiguous: 
                                                
140 This is of note, because the question of what provisions apply to a shelter 
hearing—or any hearing that occurs before the full abuse or neglect 
adjudication—is one that states continue to grapple with: some finding section 
1922’s emergency removal requirements applicable, others finding section 1912 
foster care proceedings requirements applicable. Importantly, the regulations 
define emergency proceeding as “any court action that involves an emergency 
removal or emergency placement of an Indian child.”  25 C.F.R. § 23.2. Where 
the 
guidelines state, “[w]hile States use different terminology (e.g., preliminary 
protective hearing, shelter hearing) for emergency hearings, the regulatory 
definition of emergency proceedings is intended to cover such proceedings as 
may be necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.” 
Guidelines at 23. 
141 Matter of Welfare of S.R.K., 911 N.W.2d 821, 825–26 (2018). 
142 Id. at 827–28.  Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (“No termination of parental 
rights may be ordered ... in the absence of a determination, supported by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert 
witnesses that the continued custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to 
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”) with Minn. Stat. § 
260.771, subdiv. 6(a). (“In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court 
must determine by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of 
a qualified expert witness, that continued custody of the child by the parent ... is 
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child as defined in 
[25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)].”). 
143 Id. at 827. As recited by the case, those rules are as follows: 
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine 
whether the statute's language, on its face, is ambiguous." 500, 
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Read straightforwardly, the statute provides that to 
terminate parental rights, a district court must 
determine that "continued custody of the child by 
the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional 
or physical damage to the child." 25 U.S.C. 1912(f). 
This determination must be supported by evidence 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," and part of the 
supporting evidence must be QEW testimony. 144 
  
 Notably, the appellate court rejected both the State’s 
argument—that a QEW must testify but that it need not support the 
determination regarding continued custody—and the parents’ 
argument—that the QEW must specifically testify that to the 
language of the continued custody determination.145   
 The appellate court then found that the testimony of the 
QEW supported the finding that continued custody by the mother 
would be detrimental to the children and that this evidence coupled 
by the other evidence met the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
of proof.146  With regard to the father, however, the court found that 
termination had been improper because the agency had failed to 
provide testimony from a QEW that supported a finding that 
continued custody would be detrimental to the child.147 The court 
therefore reversed the termination of the father’s rights.148 
 
                                                
LLC v. City of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn. 
2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A 
statute is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation." Id. To determine the plain meaning 
of a statute, we will construe the words "according to the rules 
of grammar and their common and approved usage." Jones v. 
Borchardt, 775 N.W.2d 646, 647 (Minn. 2009); see 
also Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2016) (same). We will also "look 
to the dictionary definitions of [the] words and apply them in 
the context of the statute." State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 
488 (Minn. 2016). 
144 Id. at 830.  
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 831. Other evidence showed long-term agency involvement, testimony 
from a psychologist of mother’s poor life choices belief that the children should 
not be returned, and testimony that mother was not engaging in any of the 
required services. Id.  
147 Id. at 832.  
148 Id. 
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Diego K. v. State, Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvs. 411 P.3d 622 
(Alaska, 2018).149 
 
In this Alaska case regarding the standards of removing a 
child from the home, the mother and father appealed a superior court 
order removing their 16-year-old child, Mary, from their home, 
arguing that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) did not meet 
the standards required under ICWA.150 
 In 2014, OCS took emergency custody of the couple’s 
children after it received information indicating that their older son 
had to be medevac’d out of the village due to alcohol poisoning and 
that the entire family abused alcohol.151 After a two day disposition 
hearing that began on the last day of December, the court found the 
expert witness testimony to be deficient and returned Mary to her 
parents, but the court also kept the family under OCS supervision.152 
Between January 2015 and April 2016, the court held six status 
hearings.153 Those hearings were informal, and no evidence was 
admitted. In April 2016, the court held a removal hearing where 
OCS called a number of witnesses. The witnesses testified as to 
Mary’s absenteeism from school, the social worker’s inability to 
address the mold issue in the home, and the social worker’s 
unwillingness to work with the father. The village administrator also 
testified that the parents were missing their sobriety checks.154 After 
the hearing, the court ordered Mary to be removed from the home. 
The court based the removal and findings of active efforts on 
information provided in the previous hearings.155 
 The Alaska Supreme Court remanded that order to make 
additional removal findings, and the court amended its order to 
explain that the findings were based on the previous, unsworn 
testimony of the social workers.156 The parents again appealed, 
arguing that the findings used to remove Mary from the home could 
not be based on unsworn testimony. The Supreme Court agreed, 
                                                
149 Diego K. v. State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs. 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska, 
2018). 
150 Id. at 624. 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 625. 
153 Id. at 626. 
154 Id. at 627. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
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noting that the Alaska Evidence Rules apply in all Child in Need of 
Aid (CINA) cases.157 
 The Alaska Supreme Court discussed the relatively informal 
nature of CINA cases and the need for multiple parties to 
communicate throughout the case, including parents, attorneys, 
guardians ad litem, and social workers and how courts may choose 
to schedule informal hearings for updates. However, when the 
discussion at the hearing shifts from updates to making specific legal 
and factual findings, the court held that those findings must be based 
on admitted evidence.158 The court also held that the parents’ 
preserved this issue for appeal, both by objecting to testimony and 
by requesting that the court swear in a witness.159 In addition, the 
parents could not have known at the time of testimony that the court 
would later rely on that unsworn evidence to make removal findings 
four months later.160 The Alaska Supreme Court vacated the 
removal order and remanded the case back to superior court. 
 
In re B.Y., 432 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2018). 
 
In this Montana termination of parental rights case, neither 
the hearing transcripts nor written orders discuss how the agency 
had made active efforts before removal and termination.161 Notably, 
the appellate court found that the trial court correctly applied ICWA 
because there was “reason to know” the children were Indian 
children as indicated in the agency’s affidavits. The appellate court 
also noted that although the agency served relevant tribes with 
requests to determine the membership status and eligibility of the 
children, one of the tribes never replied. The appellate court then 
held that without an answer from that tribe, the trial court correctly 
determined that the case should proceed as though ICWA 
applied. The father appealed.  
After reciting the 2016 ICWA regulations, the appellate 
court stated that under ICWA, “the district court must document in 
detail in the record how active efforts have been made by clear and 
convincing evidence prior to removal and beyond a reasonable 
doubt prior to termination,” and because the trial court in this 
                                                
157 Id. at 629. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 In re B.Y., 432 P.3d 129, 130 (Mont. 2018); 
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instance had failed to provide that documentation, it erred.162  The 
court then vacated the termination order and remanded the matter  
“for the court to ‘document in detail’ if the [agency ]met its burden 
of providing ‘active efforts’ by clear and convincing evidence prior 
to removal and beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termination.”   
 
V.   ALL REPORTED STATE CASES 
 
As a federal law implemented by state courts, ICWA holds 
a unique place in child welfare jurisprudence. Included below is a 
comprehensive listing of all reported 2018 state and federal cases 
involving ICWA. This quick reference should allow busy 
practitioners to quickly find and review all new case law on any 
given ICWA topic that may arise in their caseload without the 
tedious work of searching through fifty jurisdictions and numerous 
topics.  
Cases that were not reported and reported cases that only 
mention ICWA to clarify that the child involved was not ICWA-
eligible have not been included.  
 
Case Name Citation Named Tribe1 Outcome Party Appealing 
 
Active Efforts 
   
In re B.Y. 432 P.3d 129 (Mont. 
2018) 
Unknown Remand Father 
 
Adoption of Micah H. 
v. Tyler, R. (In re 
Adoption of Micah 
H.) 







   
In re Interest of 
M.R.M. 
No. 17CA0255, 2018 
WL 549513 (Colo. App. 
2018) 
Unnamed Affirmed Mother 
 
Appointment of Counsel 
   
                                                
162 Id. at 131.  
1 The “named tribe” is the most specific information available in the case. When 
a tribe is named it indicates that there is “reason to believe” the child might be 
an Indian child. If the tribe is “unnamed,” this means that the tribe’s name does 
not appear in the case. If the tribe is “unknown,” this means that the parent does 
not know the tribe’s name but has stated there is an affiliation.  
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B.L.L.S. v. B.S. (In re 
Interest of B.L.L.S) 
557 S.W.3d 486 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2018) 
Cherokee Nation Affirmed Mother and Father 
 
Burden of Proof 
   
In re Interest of M.V. 432 P.3d 628 (Colo. App. 
2018) 
Sioux Remand Mother 
 
Consent to Termination 
   
In re Williams 915 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. 
2018) 








    
K.L. v. A.A. (In re 
K.L.) 
237 Cal.Rptr.3d 915 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
Karuk Tribe Affirmed Father 
In re E.R. No. 17CA0460, 2018 
WL 1959477 (Colo. App. 
2018) 
Unknown Remand Mother 
 
Guardianship 
   
In re Guardianship of 
I.L.J.E. 







    
In re Beers Nos. 341100, 341101, 
2018 WL 4339705 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2018).  
Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe 
Remand Mother and Father 
B.B.S. v. B.T.S. (In re 
Interest of B.S.S.) 
557 S.W.3d 511 
(Missouri Ct. App. 2018) 
Cherokee Nation Affirmed Mother and Father 
In re J.J.C. 432 P.3d 149 (Mont. 
2018) 
Arapahoe Tribe Affirmed Mother 





J.W.E v. State (In re 
J.W.E.) 
 
419 P.3d 374 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2018) 
Choctaw Reverse Mother 
 
Inquiry 
    
In re Elizabeth M. 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 
(Cal. Ct. App 2018) 
Redtail Tribe Remand Mother 
 
 
In re E.R. 
238 Cal.Rptr.3d 871 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
Apache Remand Mother and Father 
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State v. J.L. (In re 
Interest of J.L.) 
428 P.3d 612 (Colo. App. 
2018) 
Kiowa  Remand Mother 
 
 
In re Interest of L.M.  
433 P.3d 114 (Colo. App. 
2018) 
Unknown Reverse Father 
 
Jurisdiction 
    
 
Holly C.v. Tohono 
O'odham Nation  







    
Crouch v. Ark. Dep’t 
of Human Servs. 
547 S.W.3d 102 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2018) 
Cherokee Affirmed Mother 
 
Lawrence v. Ark. 
Dep’t of Human 
Servs. 
548 S.W.3d 192 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2018) 
Unnamed Affirmed Mother 
 
N.G. v. S.A. (In re 
N.G.) 
238 Cal.Rptr.3d 304 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
Cherokee Remand Mother 
 
 
E.H. v. Sally H. (In re 
E.H.) 
238 Cal. Rptr.3d 1 (Cal. 





In re Interest of M.V. 
432 P.3d 628 (Colo. App. 
2018) 
Lakota Remand Mother 
 
 
In re Interest of L.H. 
431 P.3d 663 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2018) 
Navajo-Dine Remand Mother 
 
In re Interest of I.B-R. 
No. 16JV2312019 WL 
762562 (Colo. Ct. App. 
Feb. 21, 2019) 
Cherokee Remand Father 
 
 
In re L.A.G.  






In re D.E. 
423 P.3d 586 (Mont. 
2018) 
Blackfeet Tribe Remand Mother 
 
 
C.A. v. C.T. (In re 
C.A.) 
239 Cal. Rptr.3d 493 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
Wichita Affirmed Mother and Father 
In re A.P. 818 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2018) 
Cherokee Remand Mother 
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Placement Preferences  
 
Day v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. 
562 S.W. 3d 871 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 2018) 
Cherokee Nation Affirmed Mother 
 
 
In re Interest of M.D. 






Qualified Expert Witness 
   
In re Welfare of 
S.R.K.  
911 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 
2018) 




Mother and Father 
 
Removal 
    
Alaska Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. 
Michelle P. 





Diego K. v. Alaska 
Dep’t of Health & 
Social Servs. 
 




Remand Mother and Father 
Demetria H. v. Alaska 
Dep’t of Health and 
Soc. Servs. 






Harjo v. Ark. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. 
548 S.W.3d 865 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2018) 
Cherokee Nation Affirmed Mother 
 
Swangel v. Ark. Dep’t 
of Human Servs. 
547 S.W. 3d 111 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 2018) 
Choctaw Nation Affirmed Mother 
 
 
Collin E. v. H.S. (In re 
Collin E.) 
236 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
Cherokee Nation Affirmed Mother and Father 
 
 
In re P.T.D. 
424 P.3d 619 (Mont. 
2018) 
Fort Peck  Affirmed Father 
 
 
In re A.L.D. 
417 P.3d 342 (Mont. 
2018) 
Fort Peck  Affirmed Father 
 
 
V.D. v. Black (In re 
V.D.) 
431 P.3d 381 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2018) 
Choctaw Nation Affirmed Mother 
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In re Interest of A.M. 
No. 08-18-00105-CV, 
2018 WL 6583392 (Tex. 
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018) 





In re Interest of J.L.C. 
No. 07-18-00052-CV, 




Affirmed Mother and Father 
 
 
In re Interest of 
K.S.D. 
904 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 
2018) 
Unnamed Affirmed Father 
 
Transfer to Tribal Court 
   





Reverse Guardian ad 
Litem 
J.Y. v. R.T. (In re 
J.Y.) 
241 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018) 
Pit River Indian 
Tribe 
Affirmed Mother 
A.S. v. C.S. (In re 
A.S.) 
239 Cal.Rptr.3d 20 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2018) 
Mesa Grande 
Band of Mission 
Indians 
Affirmed Mother and Father 
 
